Trump’s Tariff: A Commercial Attack and a Strategic Opportunity for Brazil
- Maurício Kenyatta
- Jul 27
- 7 min read
Introduction
In July 2025, the United States—under President Donald Trump’s administration—imposed unprecedented tariffs on key Brazilian exports, including steel, aluminum, and agricultural commodities. While officially framed as an economic maneuver, this decision should be understood as a political gesture of coercion. It reveals a broader transformation in the global order and places Brazil at a critical crossroads.
As Gillian Hart (2023) proposes in her framework of conjunctural analysis, understanding moments like this requires connecting three layers: structure, conjuncture, and event. Structurally, Brazil remains dependent on a narrow set of export markets and primarily sells low value-added goods. Conjuncturally, the global order is witnessing a shift from multilateral cooperation to nationalist protectionism. The event—the U.S. tariff—is not an isolated disruption, but part of a strategic effort by a major power to reshape trade relations through force rather than rules.
Strategic Vulnerabilities and the Weaponization of Tariffs
The imposition of tariffs by the United States on Brazilian exports must be understood not merely as an economic dispute, but as a deliberate deployment of tariffs as “commercial weapons” in pursuit of geopolitical and domestic objectives (Lee, 2022; Kim & Margalit, 2021; Fetzer & Schwarz, 2019). The international political economy literature demonstrates that tariffs allow powerful countries to economically pressure adversaries, shape domestic and foreign policy decisions, and protect their own strategic interests (Kim & Margalit, 2021; Lee, 2022).
Mechanisms of Tariff Weaponization
Tariffs may be designed to inflict targeted economic harm, often focusing on politically sensitive sectors or regions within the affected country. Research shows that, for example, Chinese retaliatory tariffs during the US–China trade war disproportionately targeted U.S. regions and sectors supportive of the incumbent administration, with measurable effects on electoral outcomes (Kim & Margalit, 2021; Fetzer & Schwarz, 2019; Kim & Margalit, 2019).
The U.S. has similarly used tariffs as a negotiating tool, attempting to extract concessions or force policy changes from trading partners (Guo et al., 2018; Zheng et al., 2022). However, these measures tend to escalate: retaliation often triggers trade wars that result in higher costs, global market disruptions, and welfare losses on both sides (Lee, 2022; Amiti et al., 2019; Contractor, 2025). Empirical studies confirm that such confrontations have led to significant declines in bilateral trade, increased consumer prices, and reduced overall economic welfare (Amiti et al., 2019; Zheng et al., 2022).
For Brazil, the repercussions are substantial. The agricultural sector (especially soybean and beef producers), metallurgical industries, and export-oriented regions (such as the Central-West and Minas Gerais) are disproportionately exposed to losses in employment, wages, and market access. These effects are not only economic but also social, amplifying regional inequalities and undermining domestic development efforts.
Tariffs as Imperialist Tools
The literature further identifies that when imposed excessively by dominant powers, tariffs can operate as tools of economic imperialism (Tower, 1979; Kwan, 2020). By restricting the industrialization and development of weaker economies, such practices replicate colonial-era exploitation mechanisms. The British use of tariffs in colonial India, for example, significantly constrained local industrial growth, perpetuating underdevelopment for the benefit of the imperial power.
In contemporary contexts, the US–China trade war is a clear illustration of the use of tariffs to defend global hegemony and limit a rival’s technological ascent (Kwan, 2020; Sukar & Ahmed, 2019). The same logic underpins U.S. tariffs against Brazil: by impeding the growth of Brazilian export sectors, the U.S. not only protects its domestic industries but also entrenches asymmetric dependencies, limiting Brazil’s capacity for economic autonomy and technological advancement.
Risks, Limitations, and Domestic Harm
Academic evidence strongly suggests that the weaponization of tariffs comes with severe risks and limitations. Tariffs ultimately increase costs for consumers and firms in both the imposing and targeted countries (Amiti et al., 2019; Contractor, 2025; Zheng et al., 2022). They provoke retaliatory cycles (“tariff wars”), which leave all parties worse off compared to a liberal trade environment (Kennan & Riezman, 1988; Kaldor, 1940). For Brazil, the inflationary effect of lost export markets and rising input costs will be felt in food prices, manufactured goods, and the broader cost of living.
These dynamics reinforce historical patterns of dependency described by Furtado and the structuralists: peripheral economies reliant on primary exports are perennially vulnerable to coercion and manipulation by core states (Furtado, 2005; Hart, 2023). The present conjuncture thus echoes the warnings of previous generations of Brazilian and international scholars, underlining the urgency of a coherent national response.
It is worth noting, as German economist Daniel Gros observes, that the magnitude of U.S. tariffs on Chinese products—much higher than on goods from other countries—ends up inadvertently enhancing Brazil’s competitiveness. As the relative price difference between Brazilian and Chinese goods narrows, Brazil is temporarily better positioned to gain market share in the U.S. market, particularly in sectors where it already has comparative or latent advantages (Gros, 2019). This dynamic, however, is contingent on Brazil’s ability to respond strategically and invest in its own productive capabilities.
A Path Forward: Strategic Response and Historical Opportunity
While the crisis is severe, it also presents a historic opportunity. Brazil can and must design a national strategy of economic security based on four pillars:
1. Market diversification, reducing dependence on U.S. and Chinese markets.
Market diversification, reducing dependence on U.S. and Chinese markets.
This is not merely a defensive adjustment to current tensions, but a structural imperative. Over-reliance on a limited set of export markets exposes Brazil to external shocks and political manipulation. Diversifying trade partners—especially in Africa, South America, and South-East Asia—can strengthen Brazil’s resilience, expand its influence in the Global South, and reduce systemic vulnerabilities.
2. Reindustrialization with emphasis on technology, innovation, and regional value chains.
A mission-oriented industrial policy, as advocated by Mariana Mazzucato (2015), is critical for transforming temporary trade openings into lasting national development. Brazil should pursue strategies that align public and private sectors toward ambitious, shared goals, such as advancing technological capacity, sustainable agribusiness, and digital infrastructure. This includes retaining highly skilled researchers, offering targeted tax incentives for innovation-driven foreign firms, reducing regulatory barriers, and strengthening public research institutions like Embrapa—an internationally recognized driver of Brazilian agricultural and technological competitiveness.
3. Active diplomacy, reclaiming leadership in the Global South and in multilateral institutions.
Brazil’s strategic response must go beyond internal economic adjustments and embrace a proactive foreign policy stance. Active diplomacy is essential to reassert Brazil’s leadership in the Global South and to shape the norms and agendas of multilateral institutions such as the WTO, FAO, and UNCTAD. By deepening South-South cooperation, forging new partnerships with African and Asian economies, and revitalizing its engagement with regional blocs like Mercosur, Brazil can enhance its negotiating power and foster coalitions capable of challenging unilateral measures imposed by major powers. Furthermore, diplomatic activism is crucial for defending Brazil’s interests in global rule-making processes, ensuring that trade, investment, and technology flows reflect more equitable and development-oriented frameworks.
4. Reinstitutionalization of trade governance, rebuilding agencies like APEX, MDIC, and Itamaraty with a focus on long-term strategic planning.
Brazil’s strategic response must go beyond internal economic adjustments and embrace a proactive foreign policy stance. Active diplomacy is essential to reassert Brazil’s leadership in the Global South and to shape the norms and agendas of multilateral institutions such as the WTO, FAO, and UNCTAD. By deepening South-South cooperation, forging new partnerships with African and Asian economies, and revitalizing its engagement with regional blocs like Mercosur, Brazil can enhance its negotiating power and foster coalitions capable of challenging unilateral measures imposed by major powers. Furthermore, diplomatic activism is crucial for defending Brazil’s interests in global rule-making processes, ensuring that trade, investment, and technology flows reflect more equitable and development-oriented frameworks.
Comparatively, other countries targeted by Trump’s tariffs, such as China, Mexico, and the EU, responded by consolidating regional integration, investing in technological sovereignty, and leveraging global institutions. Brazil’s failure to coordinate a similar response exacerbates its isolation and exposes structural weaknesses in its trade and diplomatic apparatus.
During the ongoing U.S.–China trade war, China leveraged similar moments to accelerate domestic technological upgrading and diversify both suppliers and markets. Brazil’s response, in contrast, remains fragmented, lacking a coordinated national industrial or export policy. If this gap is not addressed, Brazil risks remaining a price taker in global value chains—perpetuating dependency rather than building the foundations for autonomous growth.
These are not technocratic adjustments—they are political decisions. As Robert Wade and Ha-Joon Chang argue, development in a context of unequal global integration requires assertive state intervention and policy coherence. Brazil must break from its colonial export logic and build a sovereign, development-centered insertion into the global economy.
Conclusion
Two paths lie ahead. One is the continuation of vulnerability and reaction, accepting a subordinate position in the international system. The other is the construction of a sovereign, strategic, and autonomous project of national development and international insertion.
The U.S. tariff is more than an economic aggression—it is a wake-up call. It challenges Brazil to abandon illusions of automatic alignment and instead reclaim its capacity to act with autonomy, forge new alliances, and defend its national interests.
As Rubens Ricupero stated, Brazil must respond “on the same level.” Not through retaliation for its own sake, but through the formulation of a coherent, assertive, and visionary strategy of international reinsertion. Now is the time to stop behaving like a commercial colony—and start thinking like a global leader.
References
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